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THE MANY MEANINGS OF MONTGOMERY V. LOUISIANA: 
HOW THE SUPREME COURT REDEFINED 






Henry Montgomery has survived the remarkable arc of the Supreme 
Court’s evolution juvenile sentencing. In 1970, Louisiana sentenced him to 
die in prison for the murder of a police officer, a crime he committed when 
he was seventeen years old.1 The sentence was mandatory, and it was 
perfectly legal. At that time it was also perfectly legal to execute juveniles. 
A generation later, the Supreme Court barred the execution of children 
under age sixteen in 1988,2 but the next year refused to extend the bar to all 
juveniles.3 Not until 2005 did the Court exempt all juveniles from the death 
penalty.4 In half a decade, the Court ruled that juveniles could not be 
imprisoned for life without any possibility of release for non-homicides.5 A 
mere two years later, yet forty-six years after Mr. Montgomery’s 
conviction, the Court declared, in Miller v. Alabama,6 that mandatory life 
sentences like Mr. Montgomery’s were unconstitutional.  
Miller confirmed the lessons of these prior decisions that children’s 
youth and immaturity make them categorically different for sentencing 
purposes, and that life imprisonment without parole is akin to the death 
                                                
* Brandon Buskey is a senior staff attorney for the Criminal Law Reform Project of the 
American Civil Liberties Union. 
1 State v. Montgomery, 242 So.2d 818 (La. 1970). 
2 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
3 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
4 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
5 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
6 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
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penalty for juveniles. Thus, automatically sentencing children to a lifetime 
of imprisonment “poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.”7 
The Eighth Amendment’s protection against “cruel and usual punishments” 
therefore prohibits such sentences. 
But Mr. Montgomery’s path to a hope for release was not yet complete. 
In fact, it was cut off by the Louisiana Supreme Court. That court ruled Mr. 
Montgomery could not benefit from Miller8 because,9 under the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane,10 Miller did not apply 
retroactively to cases that were already final at the time of the decision. Mr. 
Montgomery’s case became final in 1984, thirty years too soon. 
In Montgomery v. Louisiana,11 the Supreme Court reversed the 
Louisiana Supreme Court and held that Miller applies retroactively. The 
Court found that, by categorically prohibiting life sentences for the majority 
of juveniles whose crimes reflect “transient immaturity” rather than 
“irreparable corruption,” Miller announced a substantive rule of criminal 
law that is not subject to Teague’s general bar against retroactivity. Now, 
unless Louisiana can show that the crimes of those like Montgomery 
demonstrate “irreparable corruption,” it must grant them meaningful hope 
of “some years of life outside prison walls.”12  
As discussed below, Montgomery affirmed Court’s supremacy in 
declaring federal law while bolstering the significant limits that Miller 
places on states’ ability to condemn any juvenile to die in prison. But the 
Court left unresolved a critical question: how much hope for release is 
enough? Whatever the answer, it must account for Miller’s impact on the 
obligation of states to grant parole to juveniles facing lifelong incarceration. 
This article asserts that Miller cabins the state’s power to deny parole 
permanently to reformed juveniles. It does so by creating a modest, but 
absolute, liberty interest in release before death for rehabilitated youth. The 
Supreme Court, rather than state parole systems, must be the ultimate 
protector of this right. 
 
I. HOW THE MONTGOMERY COURT DECIDED IT COULD DECIDE 
 
The central issue in Montgomery was whether Miller applied 
retroactively. However, the Court first had to determine whether it could 
even decide the case. In addition to granting certiorari on retroactivity, the 
                                                
7 Id. at 2469. 
8 State v. Montgomery, 141 So.3d 264 (La. 2014).  
9 State v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829 (La. 2013). 
10 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
11 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
12 Id. at 736-37. 
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Court sua sponte inserted the question of whether it had jurisdiction to 
review Louisiana’s determination that Miller was not retroactive.13 Both 
Mr. Montgomery and Louisiana agreed the Court had jurisdiction,14 mostly 
likely since the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly relied on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane,15 thus creating a federal question for 
Supreme Court review.16 Unsatisfied, the Court appointed a special amicus 
to argue against jurisdiction.  
At stake was what it means for the Court to declare a rule retroactive. In 
Teague and subsequent cases, the Court identified the federal habeas statute 
as the source of its authority to apply rules retroactively.17 If that is true, 
then Teague only binds federal habeas courts. That leaves Congress free to 
alter Teague under its power to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts. That also leaves states free to fashion their own rules for applying 
new rules in their own courts. In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
expressly declared that it was not obligated to follow Teague.18 However, if 
the Court’s power to announce and apply new rules retroactively derives 
from the Constitution, states have no discretion on applying new federal 
constitutional rules in their courts. 
The Court partially addressed these issues in Danforth v. Minnesota.19 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, under state law, gave retroactive effect to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. United States,20 which 
announced a new rule granting criminal defendants the right to cross-
examine any testimonial statement at trial. Minnesota did so despite the fact 
that the Supreme Court had earlier held in Whorton v. Bockting that 
Crawford was not retroactive.21 While the Danforth Court acknowledged 
that Whorton did not require states to apply Crawford to cases on collateral 
review, it nonetheless held that states could choose to apply Crawford 
retroactively under state law.22 
Central to Danforth was the Court’s framing of retroactivity as deciding 
what remedies are available for constitutional violations.23 Under this view, 
                                                
13 Id. at 727. 
14 Id. 
15 State v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 829 (La. 2013). 
16 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
17 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 277 (2008). 
18 State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292 (La. 1992). 
19 See Danforth, 552 U.S. at 282. 
20 Crawford v. United States, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
21 See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 409 (2007). 
22 See Danforth, 552 U.S. at 282. 
23 Id. at 275. 
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Teague identifies the remedies available in federal habeas.24 But states are 
free to provide broader remedies under their own law.25 Shrugging off 
concerns that this approach undermined the uniform enforcement of federal 
law—a key value in Teague—the Court justified the result as a necessary 
consequence of the states’ independent sovereignty. Thus, “the remedy a 
state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of the Federal 
Constitution is primarily a question of state law.”26 
Chief Justice Roberts, in a dissent joined by Justice Kennedy, countered 
that retroactivity of constitutional rules is always an issue of federal law.27 
The Supremacy Clause therefore binds states to the Court’s retroactivity 
decisions. Roberts argued that retroactivity does not involve a choice of 
available remedies, but a choice of law, specifically, whether the old law or 
the new law applies.28 Only the Supreme Court may make this choice for 
constitutional rules. Roberts dismissed the majority’s grounding of Teague 
in the federal habeas statute as irrelevant, since Congress’ authority over the 
lower federal courts cannot usurp the Court’s prerogative to decide federal 
law.29 
Despite the majority’s broad language empowering states to decide what 
relief they afford to constitutional rights, it limited Danforth to situations 
where states provide broader relief on collateral review than what is 
required under Teague.30 The Court declined to resolve if states must apply 
retroactive rules in post-conviction, or if Congress could amend Teague by 
statute.31 
The debate in Danforth over the meaning of retroactivity helps explain 
why the Court insisted on addressing its jurisdiction in Montgomery. The 
Court, in an opinion written by Danforth dissenter Justice Kennedy, held 
that states must give retroactive effect to new substantive rules, those which 
prohibit states from criminalizing certain conduct or imposing certain 
punishments for a class of defendants.32 The Court explained that new 
substantive rules categorically barring penalties are required by the 
Constitution itself.33 Any penalty that violates a substantive rule is therefore 
void and unenforceable, regardless of when the defendant’s conviction 
                                                
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 282. 
26 Id. at 288. 
27 Id. at 291 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
28 Id. at 307. 
29 Id. at 308-09. 
30 Id. at 269 n.4 (majority opinion). 
31 Id. 
32 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2016). 
33 Id. at 729-30. 
 CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM [Vol. 19:94 98 
became final.34  
Though the majority did not mention the “choice of remedies” versus 
“choice of law” conflict that animated Danforth, Montgomery unmistakably 
adopts the choice of law view, at least for substantive rules. The majority 
also did not address whether Congress could overrule Teague. Nonetheless, 
Congress clearly may not, again, at least with respect to new substantive 
rules.35 Montgomery thus preserves the Court’s supremacy vis-a-vis the 
states and Congress in declaring new substantive rules 
Beyond settling these fundamental issues of federalism and the 
separation of powers, the practical import of Montgomery’s jurisdictional 
ruling is elusive. Had the Court held it did not have jurisdiction in 
Montgomery, it could have eventually addressed Miller’s retroactivity via a 
federal habeas case. Several such cases were pending when the Court issued 
Montgomery,36 and all of the Court’s post-Teague retroactivity decisions 
arose from federal habeas.37 A decision out of federal habeas would have 
had the same effect as a decision out of state collateral review: states would 
have to apply Miller if it was retroactive, or they would be left to decide 
whether to apply Miller if it was not. 
 
II. THE MONTGOMERY COURT’S SHAPING OF MILLER INTO A 
CATEGORICAL RULE 
 
Having established its authority to decide whether Miller announced a 
retroactive substantive rule, the Court turned to this main issue. The Court 
first determined that substantive rules must categorically limit the states 
authority to either define crimes or impose a punishment on a class of 
persons.38 By this rubric, Miller’s chances of qualifying as substantive were 
grim. Miller pointedly stated that it was not categorically barring a sentence 
for a class of offenders, and that it was only mandating that states follow a 
certain process—considering a juvenile’s youth and attendant 
circumstances—before imposing punishment.39 For this reason, many who 
argued that Miller was substantive relied on the Court’s earlier suggestion 
that substantive rules include, but are not necessarily limited to, categorical 
guarantees.40 To assert otherwise would seemingly require the Court to 
                                                
34 Id. at 731-32. 
35 See id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
36 See, e.g., Davis v. McCollum, 798 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, No. 15-
8005, 2016 WL 531245 (Jan. 22, 2016). 
37 See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 413 (2007). 
38 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729. 
39 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012). 
40 See, e.g., Brandon Buskey & Daniel Korobkin, Elevating Substance Over 
Procedure: The Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama Under Teague v. Lane, 18 CUNY L. 
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contradict itself. 
But that is essentially what the Court did. The Court minimized its 
statement in Miller as too general. It claimed that, while Miller did not bar a 
penalty for all juveniles, Miller did ban life imprisonment without release 
for all juveniles whose crimes do not reflect irreparable corruption.41 
Fortunately, the Court’s innovation has precedent, even if Miller is not that 
precedent. As the Montgomery Court suggested, creating a categorical bar is 
an exercise in line drawing.42 Roper drew a line banning the death penalty 
for juveniles. Graham drew a more specific line prohibiting life 
imprisonment for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses. In the 
death penalty, the Court has drawn a host of lines exempting those with a 
mental disability,43 those who are insane,44 those who have not committed a 
homicide,45 and those who did not intend to commit a homicide.46 The 
Court has extended this line drawing beyond extreme sentencing to prohibit 
any punishment for “status offenses,” such as being addicted to drugs47 or 
too poor to pay a fine.48  
Most importantly, Montgomery applied Miller’s line drawing to all life 
without parole sentences imposed on juveniles, though Miller specifically 
addressed the constitutionality of mandatory life without parole for 
juveniles. This likely means that states must provide collateral review for all 
juveniles serving life without the possibility of parole, regardless of whether 
those sentences were mandatory. Think of it this way: the Court’s 
prohibition in Atkins v. Virginia49 on executing the mentally disabled is a 
retroactive, substantive rule.50 It gave every death row inmate the right to 
establish they belonged to the new category of individuals exempt from 
execution. By this same reasoning, Montgomery grants every juvenile 
serving life imprisonment without parole the right to establish that their 
crimes reflected “transient immaturity,” the category of individuals now 
exempt from a death-in-prison sentence.51  
                                                                                                                       
REV. 21, 26 (2014) (arguing that Miller announced a substantive obligation which should 
be found retroactive under Teague); Beth A. Colgan, Alleyne v. United States, Age as an 
Element, and the Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama, 61 UCLA L. R. DISC. 262, 263 
(2013). 
41 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
42 Id. 
43 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305 (2002).  
44 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 400 (1986). 
45 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008). 
46 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982). 
47 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 678 (1962). 
48 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397 (1971). 
49 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
50 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 303 (1989), overruled by Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304. 
51 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735. 
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III. THE ADEQUACY OF PAROLE UNDER MILLER 
 
The Montgomery majority anticipated the chaos of states holding 
sentencing hearings that require the state to prove that a juvenile was 
irreparably corrupt at the time of an offense from decades ago.52 It therefore 
suggested states could avoid these difficulties by granting juveniles 
parole.53 This conclusion necessarily assumes that access to parole would 
protect juveniles from dying in prison by allowing them to demonstrate 
their maturity and capacity for change.  
Yet, if the central premise of Miller is that, regardless of their crimes, 
nearly every juvenile must have a meaningful opportunity for some years 
outside prison walls, it is not at all clear that parole always satisfies this 
standard, either doctrinally or practically. Doctrinally, the Supreme Court 
has refused to recognize a constitutional right to release before the end of a 
valid sentence.54 States are not obligated to even have a parole system, and, 
when they do, they are free to define the factors relevant to release.55 One’s 
expectation of release is thus entirely up to the state.56  
Practically speaking, individuals convicted of violent offenses stand 
little chance of being granted parole in many states.57 As Professor Sarah 
French Russell explains, “[t]he nature of the crime of conviction is often the 
driving force in parole decisions.”58 This status quo is deadly for juveniles 
whose only chance at release may be their state’s parole system. It 
demonstrates that merely offering parole cannot reliably guarantee that a 
juvenile whose crime did not reflect irreparable corruption might still die in 
prison.  
For Miller truly to restore juveniles’ hope for release, the ruling must 
regulate not only the state’s sentencing authority, but also its obligation to 
grant juveniles parole. Though Miller most directly guarantees juveniles an 
opportunity at release, the decision contains the corollary that juveniles who 
demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation as adults must eventually be 
released. Reformed juveniles could of course be denied release for some 
minimum amount of time to serve the penological interests of retribution, 
deterrence, and rehabilitation. But at some point those interests must yield 
to the juvenile’s right to release. Determining that point cannot be left to the 
                                                
52 Id. at 736. 
53 Id. 
54 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). 
55 Id. at 7-8. 
56 Id. at 11. 
57 Sarah F. Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, 
and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L. J. 373, 397 (2014). 
58 Id.  
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whim of state executive branches. It would require judicial review of 
whether a parole system complied with Miller. Without this check on a 
state’s ability to deny parole, Miller would become an empty promise.59 
At a minimum, Miller’s liberty interest in release before death also 
allows juveniles to challenge deficient parole procedures. For instance, 
Miller likely limits a state’s ability to maintain release factors that facially 
undermine the decision’s intent. These include allowing a parole board to 
deny release based on the charge alone and without considering a juvenile’s 
age and immaturity at the time of the offense, or to treat a juvenile’s age at 
the time of the offense as an aggravating, rather than a mitigating, 
circumstance. 
A form of this challenge has succeeded in Michigan, a state with 
approximately 360 juveniles serving mandatory life sentences without 
parole, 334 of which were on collateral review.60 In 2013, as part of a civil 
rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal district court 
invalidated Michigan’s mandatory sentencing scheme as applied to 
juveniles.61 Rather than ordering resentencings—a remedy unavailable in § 
1983 civil rights suits62—the district court ordered the parties to propose a 
parole system that would afford juveniles a meaningful opportunity for 
eventual release. The case is pending at the Sixth Circuit.  
However, the case’s fate is uncertain. Because of Montgomery, all 
Michigan juveniles formerly serving mandatory life imprisonment are 
entitled to resentencing under Michigan law. These juveniles now face a 
sentencing range between a minimum term of twenty-five to forty years, 
and a maximum term of not less than sixty years. They may only receive 
life without parole if the prosecutor moves to seek the sentence and the 
court holds an individualized sentencing hearing.63 This relief under state 
law may moot the §1983 action. Regardless, the case could offer a blueprint 
for Miller to reform juvenile parole procedures. 
While its potential for improving the parole process for juveniles is 
promising, Miller’s regulation of parole systems extends beyond procedure. 
Montgomery reading of Miller leaves states no room to disagree with the 
Court’s assessment that juvenile life without parole should be rare. Thus, 
even with appropriate procedures in place, a state’s parole system arguably 
still violates Miller if it fails to make irrevocable life sentences sufficiently 
                                                
59 In this way, Miller distinguishes juveniles from the typical adult seeking parole. 
Because states have no obligation to release adults before the end of their sentence, a valid 
conviction terminates an adult’s federal liberty interest in release. Not so with juveniles 
under Miller. 
60 Buskey & Korobkin, supra note 40, at 25. 
61 Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013). 
62 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 
63 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.25(6) (West 2016).  
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rare. That means a juvenile could contest a parole system under the Eighth 
Amendment by demonstrating that too many youth still unduly risk serving 
death-in-prison sentences. Even if a state’s parole process succeeds in 
making life imprisonment rare for juveniles, it would remain vulnerable to 
attack if impermissible factors like race result in arbitrary parole 
outcomes.64 
Juveniles who wish to show they are trapped in an unconstitutional 
parole process face daunting challenges. The first is empirical. Establishing 
that a parole system does not reliably release juveniles requires building a 
robust record on parole release decisions. Ideally, that record would 
establish that deserving juveniles were routinely being denied relief. Since 
most states do not provide access too much or all of the information the 
parole board relies on to make decisions, this may prove an insurmountable 
barrier for most juveniles.65 The second barrier is temporal. Montgomery 
does not force states to release juveniles immediately, and it offers no 
guidance on how long states may delay the decision.  As a result, release 
data for any single year, or even several years, may not suffice to challenge 
a parole system. A conservative release rate one year says nothing about 
release rates for the next year, especially if there are changes to the parole 
authority’s composition or political context. The third barrier is conceptual: 
how “rare” is “rare”? The Court provided no standards for this evaluation. It 
also did not require any particular fact-finding before a state denies release, 
leaving no objective basis for judging a parole system’s faithfulness to 
Miller. The Court’s vagueness in defining the contours of a new rule is not 
unusual, and future cases may force the Court to speak more clearly.66  
The fourth, and perhaps most daunting, barrier is institutional. Parole 
typically aims to gauge an inmate’s fitness to re-enter society. But prison is 
a terrible place to reform. This is especially true for children, most of whom 
enter prison with troubled backgrounds, only to be further traumatized by 
violence and abuse while in custody.67 Those not broken by this experience 
may carry a disciplinary record that bars them from enrichment programs. 
The problem of access is more acute for juveniles newly granted the 
opportunity for parole after Miller, many of whom are in states that deny 
                                                
64 Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
65 Russell, supra note 57, at 397. 
66 Compare Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (holding that states must make 
probable cause determinations without undue delay for incarcerated arrestees), with Cnty. 
of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (holding that states must make probable 
cause determination without undue delay, but setting presumptive limit of 48 hours). 
67 See Jessica Lahey, The Steep Costs of Keeping Juveniles in Adult Prisons, 
ATLANTIC, Jan. 8, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
education/archive/2016/01/the-cost-of-keeping-juveniles-in-adult-prisons/423201/ 
[https://perma.cc/JC5H-FKHA]. 
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reformative programming to those serving life sentences.68 Consequently, 
juveniles seeking parole must survive prison environments designed to 
obscure their path to redemption. The risk that prison will irreparably rob 
juveniles of their capacity to reform will cloud any inquiry into whether a 
parole board is properly releasing juveniles. 
These obstacles emphasize the need for advocates to ensure that 
Montgomery’s nod to parole does not allow states to turn their backs on 
Miller. Restoring the hopes of juveniles for release demands efforts in the 
courts and state legislatures to reform parole procedures, gather data on 





When Henry Montgomery stepped inside Angola forty-six years ago, he 
literally did not have the right to hope he would take another breath in the 
free world. Miraculously, now he does. To resolve the often-dry subjects of 
jurisdiction and retroactivity, Montgomery canvassed the meaning of 
federalism, the separation of powers, and ultimately, hope itself. 
Nonetheless, the decision will be of little import to those like Mr. 
Montgomery if the Court allows states simply to thwart juveniles’ 
opportunity for release with an unaccountable parole process. Miller and 
Montgomery therefore must extend to the parole process and its outcomes, 
an interpretation easily supported by Montgomery and the Court’s recent 
juvenile sentencing decisions. Realizing substantive limitations on parole, a 
process traditionally left to executive discretion, likely will not come any 
time soon, if at all. But Mr. Montgomery’s story provides some measure of 
the promise for hope to come. 
 
* * * 
                                                
68 See Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole 
Sentences in the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 29 (2010). 
